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I.   INTRODUCTION 
On February 6, 2018, SpaceX successfully launched its new Falcon Heavy 
rocket.  The rocket’s maiden flight could very well signal the arrival of a new 
stage of space exploration and commerce, one led primarily by the private 
sector.  Although SpaceX made use of government launch facilities—the test 
took place at NASA’s Space Center at Cape Canaveral, FL—the technology 
itself is privately developed.  “For the first time since the United States and 
Soviet Union began their race into orbit, the world’s most powerful rocket 
was designed and built by a private corporation.”1 
Space has typically been the domain of governments, rather than private 
actors, but in recent years the private sector has become an increasingly 
important contributor to space activities.  In 2016, the total size of the global 
space economy was $329 billion, up from $323 billion the year before.2  
Commercial spending accounted for $253 billion, approximately 76% of the 
space economy.  Government spending on space activities decreased slightly 
but was more than compensated by the increase in private expenditures.3  In 
2017, private equity flows into the space sector totaled between $2.5 billion 
and $3.9 billion4; with the continued commercial development of space 
technologies, this figure is likely to grow.  From commercial launch services 
to more exotic operations such as space tourism and asteroid mining, private 
enterprise is shaping up to be a critical driver of outer space activity, one that 
may even outpace governments. 
But even if the public sector remains the leader in space development, the 
increased prominence of private sector activities does pose several economic 
and legal challenges.  The problem posed by increased private enterprise in 
outer space can best be understood with reference to the current body of law 
governing space activities.  In international space law, sovereign states are 
parties to treaties governing the use of outer space by states and the private 
organizations within those states’ jurisdiction.  While there have been several 
international treaties on the use of space by sovereigns and their citizens, the 
 
 1 Peter Apps, Commentary: SpaceX Launch Opens New Frontier in Space Commerce, 
REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-space-commentary 
/commentary-spacex-launch-opens-new-frontier-in-space-commerce-iduskbn1fq38w. 
 2 Press Release, Space Foundation, Space Foundation Report Reveals Global Space 
Economy at $329 Billion in 2016 (Aug. 3, 2017), https:// www.spacefoundation.org/news/ 
space-foundation-report-reveals-global-space-economy-329-billion-2016. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Jeff Foust, How Long Will the Money Keep Flowing?, THE SPACE REVIEW (Feb. 5, 
2018), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3425/1. 
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most important remains the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.5  The first two Articles 
of this treaty indicate that private-led initiatives to explore and commercialize 
space may be contrary to international law and the interests of states that are 
parties to the agreements from which such law stems. 
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty (hereafter OST) reads, in part:  
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit 
and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree 
of economic or scientific development, and shall be the 
province of all mankind… Outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use 
by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of 
equality and in accordance with international law, and there 
shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.6 
Article II reads: “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by 
means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”7 
Article II is more obviously problematic for private enterprise.  This article 
clearly forbids the extension of territorial jurisdiction to space.  However, this 
may restrict governments’ ability to define and enforce private property rights, 
which would have a deleterious effect on space commercialization.  This is 
certainly true with real property.  As argued by White, “in common law 
countries such as the United States, legal theory dictates that the government 
must have sovereignty over territory before it can confer title on its citizens. 
Consequently, traditional real property rights [in outer space] are inconsistent 
with this theory.”8  However, even other kinds of property, such as the 
resources gained from an asteroid mining operation, may be implicitly 
forbidden under international law.9  Tronchetti provides a concise 
explanation: 
Under international law property rights derive from States. In 
fact, in order to exist, property rights require a superior 
 
 5 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 
205 [hereinafter OST]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Wayne White, The Legal Regime for Private Activities in Outer Space, in SPACE: THE 
FREE-MARKET FRONTIER 83 (Edward L. Hudgins ed., 2002). 
 9 Virgiliu Pop, Appropriation in Outer Space: The Relationship Between Land 
Ownership and Sovereignty on the Celestial Bodies, 16 SPACE POLICY 275, 281 (2000). 
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authority, a State, entitled to attribute and enforce them. This, 
of course, means that States need to have property rights 
themselves first before being able to recognize them to other 
subjects. Thus, any US attempt to confer property rights over 
asteroid resources to its private companies would indirectly 
signify that the United States attribute to itself ownership over 
those resources. Such an arbitrary attribution would collide 
with the non-appropriation clause, also because, as previously 
pointed out, no consensus on whether space resources can be 
removed and exploited exists. . . . Under terrestrial mining law 
a State allocates to public and private companies the right to 
exploit the natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction. 
Such a State has, indeed, the title to do so because the 
resources are located inside its territory. By attributing to a 
private company the right to mine an asteroid and to acquire 
property rights over the extracted resources, the United States 
could be accused of considering that asteroid as part of its 
territory, thus violating the non-appropriation principle. 10 
Economists have long emphasized the importance of private property 
rights for social wealth creation and generalized economic growth,11 so this 
apparent barrier to space commerce is concerning.  However, it is also 
important to note the context surrounding the agreements to space treaties has 
changed significantly since OST.  OST was drafted and signed during the 
height of the Cold War.  Many of its provisions can be read as a way for the 
United States and the Soviet Union to commit to not escalating armed conflict 
by extending their military and economic rivalry to space.12  Today’s concerns 
are much more in the form of clashes of ‘soft power’ and rivalry for space 
exploitation, rather than as a means to armed conflict.  States with capable 
space programs, such as the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 
China, could position themselves to capture the benefits flowing from the 
commercialization of space.  In addition, the small state of Luxembourg has 
recently started developing legal infrastructure for protecting space 
 
 10 Fabio Tronchetti, Private Property Rights on Asteroid Resources: Assessing the 
Legality of the Asteroids Act, 30 SPACE POLICY 193, 194 (2014). 
 11 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (1776); LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (1949); 
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 THE JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC HISTORY 16 (1973); DOUGLASS CECIL NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). 
 12 See Peter Jankowitsch, Frans van der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti, The Background and 
History of Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 1,3 (2015); Thomas E. 
Simmons, Deploying the Common Law to Quasi-Marxist Property on Mars, 51 GONZ. L. 
REV. 25, 78 (2015). 
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enterprise’s property rights to celestial resources, as a means of incentivizing 
those enterprises to locate themselves within its jurisdiction.  Whatever the de 
jure status of private property rights to outer space real estate and other 
resources is, de facto there is a strong incentive for states to promote 
commercial development to grow their power and prestige. Public 
international law, including space law, must be enforced by the voluntary 
compliance of the parties themselves.13  There is no international super-
sovereign to compel obedience to the terms of previous treaties.  Because the 
world’s states are in a ‘state of nature’ with respect to each other, if the 
benefits of cultivating space commerce exceed the costs in terms of lost 
international goodwill, sovereigns will try to find a way to render their 
activities compatible, if not with the spirit, then the letter of international law 
as expressed in treaties.  In all realms of human behavior, when the wealth 
gained in creating and enforcing property rights exceed the costs, there are 
strong incentives for economic and political actors to find ways to do so.14 
Thus if the potential gains become large enough, the OST provisions intended 
to protect space from private appropriation may no longer be self-enforcing. 
The stage seems set for another space race.  The potential wealth from 
space commercialization is enormous, and it seems the rewards will 
disproportionately accrue to the parties that position themselves to be ‘first 
movers.’  An economic perspective on this issue suggests a commercial space 
race could be globally detrimental, and contrary to the intent of Article I’s call 
for space activities to be carried out in “the interests of all countries, 
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. . .”15 In 
analyzing the economics of legal rules governing the appropriation of 
unowned resources, economists have concluded that there are significant 
differences in the incentives created by property rights to resources that must 
be created versus resources that already exist and must be appropriated.16  It 
is in society’s interest to give pizza parlors a property right to the pizzas they 
make, because this creates strong incentives for the creation and sale of pizzas. 
 
 13 Alexander W. Salter & Peter T. Leeson, Celestial Anarchy: A Threat to Outer Space 
Commerce, 34 CATO J. 581, 593 (2014); Alexander W. Salter, Ordering the Cosmos: 
Private Law and Celestial Property Rights, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 311, 319 (2017) (Showing 
that while all international law, and hence the portion of international law dealing with 
space, must be self-enforcing, not all international law is customary.  In addition to custom, 
the sources of international law include treaties, general legal principles, and, to a lesser 
extent, the writings of highly regarded scholars); Frans von der Dunk, International Space 
Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW (2015) (providing a cogent explanation of how the 
various sources of international law have informed space law). 
 14 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW 347 (1967). 
 15 OST, supra note 5. 
 16 DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAWS ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND 
WHY IT MATTERS ch. 10 (2001). 
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So long as pizza parlors can make and sell pizzas profitably, both the pizza 
parlor and society at large are wealthier.  But the story is not so simple with 
resources such as land or sub-surface minerals.  Because the gains from these 
resources are not created, but appropriated, parties interested in capturing the 
benefits flowing from the resources have an incentive to waste resources in 
racing to be the first to make a claim.  An extreme result is that the entire 
value of the wealth potentially existing in owned resources can be lost to 
society in this process.  Precisely because the benefits to being a pioneer in 
space exploration, colonization, and development are potentially massive, 
there is a corresponding benefit for wastefully using resources to increase the 
chance of being a first claimant.  Sovereigns and the commercial entities they 
oversee thus have strong private incentives to race to space, without 
necessarily considering the social costs (“…the benefits and interest of all 
countries…”) of their behavior in terms of wasted resources.17 
This paper explores the problem of appropriation of celestial resources 
using tools from the economic analysis of law.  It will examine the conditions 
under which the appropriation of resources, such as minerals, is socially 
detrimental, and ascertain whether those conditions are in fact true for outer 
space.  In doing so, this paper contributes to three separate but related 
literatures.  The first literature, which has several older contributions but is in 
the early stages of a renaissance, explores the governance and use of space in 
international relations and international organization.18  The second literature, 
probably the most developed in recent years, focuses on space commerce and 
 
 17 OST, supra note 5. 
 18 See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Outer Space and International Cooperation, 
19 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 603 (1965); Philip De Man, State Practice, Domestic 
Legislation and the Interpretation of Fundamental Principles of International Space Law, 
42 SPACE POLICY 92 (2017); Nader Elhefnawy, Territorializing Space? Revisiting an Old 
Idea, 1 ASTROPOLITICS 55 (2003); Philip C. Jessup & Howard J. Taubenfeld, Outer Space, 
Antarctica, and the United Nations, 13 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 363 (1959); Klaus 
Knorr, On the International Implications of Outer Space, 12 WORLD POLITICS 564 (1960); 
Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto 
Frontier, 43 WORLD POLITICS 336 (1991); Karl Leib, State Sovereignty in Space: Current 
Models and Possible Futures, 13 ASTROPOLITICS 1 (2015); M. J. Peterson, The Use of 
Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law, 51 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 245 (1997); 
Ian B. Perry, Law of Space resources and Operations on Celestial Bodies: Implications for 
Legislation in the United States, 15 ASTROPOLITICS 1 (2017); Konrad Szocik, Tomasz 
Wójtowicz & Leszek Baran, War or Peace? The Possible Scenarios of Colonising Mars, 
42 SPACE POLICY 31 (2017); Per Magnus Wijkman, Managing the Global Commons, 
36 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 511 (1982). 
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property rights.19  The third literature, which is the broadest, analyzes the 
economics of private governance and self-governance more generally.20   
 
 19 See Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 349 (1968); Wayne N. White, Jr., Real Property Rights in Outer Space, SPACE 
FUTURE (1998), http://www.spacefuture.com/Archive/Real_ Property_Rights_In_Outer 
_Space.Shtml; Ricky J. Lee, Reconciling International Space Law with the Commercial 
Realities of the Twenty-First Century, 4 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 194, 237 (2000); 
Lawrence A. Cooper, Encouraging Space Exploration Through a new Application of Space 
Property Rights, 19 SPACE POLICY 111, 117 (2003); Michael J. Listner, The Ownership and 
Exploitation of Outer Space: A Look at Foundational Law and Future Legal Challenges to 
Current Claims, 1 REGENT J. INT’L L. 75, 94 (2003); Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer 
Space: The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle vs. the First in Time, First in Right 
Rule of Property, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 689, 705–07 (2004); Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, 
A New Hope for International Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First 
Possession Principles Into the 1967 Space Treaty for the Colonization of Outer Space in 
the Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 299, 355–57 (2004); Henry R. Hertzfeld 
& Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the Commercial World: Property 
Rights Without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 98–99 (2005); Rosanna Sattler, 
Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 23, 44 (2005); Jeremy L. Zell, Note, Putting a Mine on the Moon: Creating an 
International Authority to Regulate Mining Rights in Outer Space, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 
489, 518 (2006); Nikhil D. Cooper, Note, Circumventing Non-Appropriation: Law and 
Development of United States Space Commerce, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 457, 482 
(2009); Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and 
International Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate it Needs to 
Survive?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 37, 78 (2008); Tony Milligan, Property Rights and the Duty 
to Extend Human Life, 27 SPACE POL’Y 190, 193 (2011); Rand Simberg, Homesteading the 
Final Frontier: A Practical Proposal for Securing Property Rights in Space, COMPETITIVE 
ENTERPRISE INST. 1 (2012), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Rand%20Simberg%20%20 
Homesteading%20the%20Final%20Frontier.pdf; Rand Simberg, Property Rights in 
Space, THE NEW ATLANTIS (2012), https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/property 
-rights-in-space; Brian C. Weeden & Tiffany Chow, Taking a Common-Pool Resources 
Approach to Space Sustainability: a Framework and Potential Policies, 28 SPACE POL’Y 
166, 172 (2012); Matthew Feinman, Mining the Final Frontier: Keeping Earth’s Asteroid 
Mining Ventures From Becoming the Next Gold Rush, 14 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 202, 
234–35 (2014); Lauren E. Shaw, Asteroids, the New Western Frontier: Applying Principles 
of the General Mining Law of 1872 to Incentive Asteroid Mining, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 121, 
168–69 (2013); Thomas R. Irwin, Note, Space Rocks: A Proposal to Govern the 
Development of Outer Space and its Resources, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 217, 245–46 (2015); 
Andrew Linter, Extraterrestrial Extraction: The International Implications of the Space 
Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, 40 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 139, 153–
54 (2016); Alexander William Salter, Space Debris: A Law and Economics Analysis of the 
Orbital Commons, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221, 237–38 (2016). 
 20 See DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM: GUIDE TO A RADICAL 
CAPITALISM, at xii–xv (3d ed. 2014); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 1–11 (1991); TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J.HILL, THE NOT 
SO WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER 4-5 (2004); Bryan Caplan & 
Edward P. Stringham, Privatizing the Adjudication of Disputes, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 504, 599 (2008); Benjamin W. Powell & Edward P. Stringham, Public Choice and the 
Economic Analysis of Anarchy: A Survey, 140 PUB. CHOICE 503, 504 (2009); Peter Boettke, 
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 surveys the 
economic problems with land appropriation.  Section 3 highlights the 
conditions under which these problems are ameliorated, and whether outer 
space is an environment where we can expect those conditions to prevail.  
Section 4 builds on these insights to discuss the potential for private, self-
enforcing law to govern private property rights in space, in a manner 
conducive to generalized wealth creation but not inimical to treaty obligations. 
Section 5 concludes by discussing what public authorities ought, and more 
importantly ought not, do in light of these findings. 
II. LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CELESTIAL LAND APPROPRIATION 
 
Following standard terminology in economics, let “land” refer to valuable 
natural resources—the unproduced factors of production—such as physical 
space on the surface of a planet, or sub-surface asteroid minerals.  The 
question before us is under what conditions are the appropriation of these 
resources by commercial entities (and, niceties of public international law 
aside, their state sponsors) beneficial to mankind?  The reason this question, 
and all similar questions, are difficult to answer is that the normative standard 
“beneficial to mankind” is highly controversial.  For the purposes of this 
paper, we focus on economic efficiency as a proxy for human welfare: the 
maximization of wealth available to society.  The question thus becomes 
should we expect the first appropriation of celestial land to be wealth 
producing, or wealth destroying, for society? 
Celestial resources are currently unowned.  First possession rules for 
appropriating unowned resources have been the focus of significant 
intellectual attention, both philosophically and legally.  Philosophically, John 
Locke21 provided a powerful argument for the appropriation of unowned land 
through the application of human labor to that land.  Legally, quasi-Lockean 
theories of property have been explicitly defended at least since Blackstone.22 
In contemporary scholarship, Ellickson23 noted that the prevalence of first 
possession norms was due to a widely shared intuition about the rightness of 
such norms.  Given the success of first appropriation rules, as evidenced by 
 
Anarchism and Austrian Economics, 7 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 125 
(2011); Edward P. Stringham & Todd J. Zywicki, Hayekian Anarchism, 78 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 290, 293 (2011); PETER T. LEESON, ANARCHY UNBOUND: WHY SELF-
GOVERNANCE WORKS BETTER THAN YOU THINK 1-3, 10 (2014); EDWARD P. STRINGHAM, 
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE (2015). 
 21 JOHN LOCKE, THE TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 97 (1824). 
 22 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 304 (J.B. 
Lippencott Co. 1893). 
 23 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 4-
5 (1991). 
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their durability and longevity, the burden of proof would seem to rest on those 
who opposed the extension of first possession methods to celestial land. 
However, not all scholars are supportive of first possession as a means of 
establishing ownership. Many scholars of law and economics, such as 
Anderson and Hill,24 Libecap and Wiggins,25 and Williams26 have argued that 
first possession can be economically inefficient. “Unlike political 
philosophers and legal scholars, the criticism from economists has 
emphasized that first possession has the potential to dissipate wealth, either 
from a wasteful race to claim an asset or as a rule of capture which leads to 
over-exploitation.”27 
Imagine two commercial space companies, Deep Space Industries and 
Planetary Resources, are considering establishing a claim by first possession 
to an asteroid that they both anticipate contains valuable mineral deposits.28 
Suppose both companies agree that these deposits will deliver a stream of 
benefits whose present discounted value, beginning in ten years, is $100 
million.  The reason for the ten year delay is that, while both companies have 
the technology to land on the asteroid and establish a claim, they have not yet 
developed the mining technology that allows them to get the full $100 million 
from the mineral deposits.  Each company could establish an ‘early’ claim—
land on the asteroid and begin extraction before the maximization of value ten 
years hence—but only at the cost of destroying $10 million in wealth for each 
year they are early.  Setting aside complications arising from time discounting, 
how will each company behave?29 
The efficient result, the one that maximizes the value of the asteroid’s 
resources to society, is for the companies to wait ten years until they have the 
 
 24 Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33 THE JOURNAL OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 177 (1990). 
 25 Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: 
Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 87 (1984). 
 26 Stephen F. Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in Water 
Resource Development, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 7 (1983). 
 27 Dean Lueck, First Possession, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 132 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 28 See Frans von der Dunk, Asteroid Mining: International and National Legal Aspects, 
26 MICHIGAN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, 83 (2017) (demonstrating the 
commensurability of asteroid mining with current public international law). 
 29 More formally, the value to society of the resource is given by 𝑉" =∫ 𝑅(𝑡))(*)+),𝑑𝑡./ , where 𝑉" is the value to society, 𝑅(𝑡) is the resource’s flow value as a 
function of time, 𝑟 is the interest rate, and 𝑔 is the rate at which the resource value grows. 
This is the first-best scenario, as noted in Lueck, supra note 27. To the extent that 
establishing a claim is costly, the resource will remain unclaimed until the value of the 
asset increases sufficient to compensate for those costs.  In the event of a single claimant, 
the above becomes 𝑉2 = ∫ 𝑅(𝑡))(*)+),𝑑𝑡 −./ 𝐶𝑒)*,6, where 𝑉2 is the value of the 
resource to the single claimant, 𝐶 is the cost of establishing property rights, and 𝑡2 is the 
time at which rights are established. Because of the costs of establishing a claim, 𝑉2 < 𝑉". 
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technology necessary to mine the minerals without destruction of wealth.  It 
is a matter of indifference to society which company establishes ownership; 
if either begins the mining operation at the appropriate time, society is $100 
million wealthier.  But do the companies have the incentive to optimally time 
their actions?30 If Deep Space Industries plans on waiting the ten years, then 
it is in Planetary Resources’ interests to preempt Deep Space Industries by a 
year in establishing the claim. In doing so, Planetary Resources guarantees 
itself $90 million in private wealth, since establishing the claim early results 
in $10 million being lost due to suboptimal timing.  But if Planetary Resources 
had waited, they might not have gotten anything at all; adjusted for the 
probability of establishing an effective claim, it is almost certainly in 
Planetary Resources’ interest to establish early and guarantee itself $90 
million.  However, in doing so, society is $10 million poorer.  Resources 
worth $100 million are now worth only $90 million.  Planetary Resources has 
no incentive to care about the $10 million in destroyed wealth; their incentive 
is to get the most out of the asteroid minerals that they can.  They reap the 
benefits; society at large bears the cost. 
But this is not the end of the story: Deep Space Industries understands 
these incentives too. Knowing Planetary Resources has an incentive to 
establish a claim one year early, Deep Space preempts this by establishing a 
claim two years early. The result is $80 million in private wealth for Deep 
Space Industries; $20 million in destroyed wealth borne by society.  Of course, 
this is not an equilibrium either.  The race for asteroid minerals will continue 
until the full value of the asteroid wealth is dissipated, when both countries 
establish a claim as soon as possible.  Instead of waiting ten years, or nine, or 
eight, both companies seek to take possession today.  They try to capture for 
themselves whatever small value remains after the destruction of wealth in the 
race.31 
Thus it seems we have good reason to worry that a second space race, this 
one primarily commercial, may seriously attenuate the potential for private 
enterprise in space to create wealth for society.  Importantly, the above process 
did not depend in any way on the resource in question.  Land wealth, whether 
in the form of sub-surface minerals on asteroids or surface real estate on Mars, 
will be dissipated in the race to establish a claim if the strategic scenario above 
holds.  The destruction of wealth from appropriations races certainly seems at 
odds with the provision in OST Article I stipulating that the “exploration and 
use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be 
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries…”  What 
 
 30 Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND 
STATISTICS 348 (1968). 
 31 The equilibrium condition is 𝑉8 = ∫ 𝑅(𝑡))(*)+),𝑑𝑡 − 𝐶𝑒)*,9 = 0.,9 , where 𝑉8 is the 
dissipated value to society, 𝐶 is the cost of establishing property rights, and 𝑡8 < 𝑡2(see 
footnote 27) is the suboptimally early time at which rights are established. 
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remains to be seen is whether we have reason to expect that a commercial 
space race will proceed along the lines of the above hypothetical. 
III. THE SPACE RACE WITH HETEROGENEOUS CLAIMANTS 
 
Intriguingly, there are many plausible scenarios under which space wealth 
will not be dissipated in a costly race among claimants.32  The simplest is 
when claimants are heterogeneous. This means that claimants, due to personal 
characteristics such as resource endowments or existing technological 
capacity, are differentially capable of establishing a celestial land claim.  The 
simplest way of describing this is that one claimant has a cost advantage over 
another claimant in establishing and enforcing property rights.  If Deep Space 
Industries can establish a claim to asteroid minerals at lower cost than can 
Planetary Resources, then Planetary Resources knows it will lose the race to 
establish a claim.  It thus has no incentive to expend the resources, which can 
only be a private loss.  Deep Space Industries knows this as well, and so has 
no incentive to establish a claim inefficiently early, since it knows it is the 
only one in the race.  The situation dovetails to the first-best value creation for 
society, minus the costs incurred by Deep Space Industries of establishing the 
claim. 
What if potential claimants do not have complete information about each 
other’s costs of establishing a claim?  Even here, full dissipation of celestial 
wealth will not occur.  In the event that neither party knows the other’s costs, 
there will still be a race, but its destructive effects will be mitigated by the fact 
that one party is better at establishing a claim than the other.  The party with 
the lower cost will find it economical to establish a claim earlier than the party 
with the higher cost and will earn private returns equal to the present 
discounted value of its cost advantage over its rival.  In fact, the results are the 
same even if we assume parties can expect differential resource flows from 
the same claim, or if the value of the resource grows differentially depending 
on which party establishes a claim. “In the extreme case, where just one 
person has costs less than the net present value of the asset’s flows, the first-
best outcome is achieved. Since only one person enters the race, there is no 
costly dissipation.”33 
 
 32 Yoram Barzel, The Capture of Wealth by Monopolists and the Protection of Property 
Rights, 14 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 393 (1994); Dean Lueck, The 
Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 393 (1995). 
 33 In the event of incomplete information, 𝑉; = ∫ 𝑅<𝐶= − 𝐶;>𝑒)*,𝑑𝑡.,? , where 𝑖 and 𝑗 
index the competitors, with 𝑖 having the cost advantage.  The larger 𝑖’s cost advantage, the 
less the amount of wealth dissipated in the race.  In the event of complete information, 𝑉; = 𝑉2 from footnote 27. See also Lueck, supra note 27, at 134. 
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The question boils down to this: is the race for celestial land better 
characterized as competition among homogeneous claimants, or 
heterogeneous claimants?  Economists’ models of competition tend to 
emphasize extreme homogeneity among firms; in the limit, ‘perfect 
competition’ is characterized by an industry with a large number of firms 
whose cost structure is identical.  But this model is useful primarily because 
it can be juxtaposed with real-world competition, in which product and cost 
structure differentiation are the heart of rivalrous activity.  Competition, 
properly understood, is not a state of affairs, but an active effort by firms to 
carve out a niche to best satisfy consumers.34 We have no reason to suspect 
this will be different for private space enterprises.  Even two companies with 
a similar mission statement and business model, such as Deep Space 
Industries and Planetary Resources, will undoubtedly develop different 
approaches for solving similar problems.  From patterns of internal finance 
and resource allocation, to investments in prospective technologies, the 
attempt by these firms to carry out their mission in competition with the other 
will pressure these firms to arrive at solutions whose formal properties—
namely least-cost production—can be stated, but the particularities of strategy 
consistent with those formal properties can and will vary greatly.  Note that 
differences in firm strategy can plausibly affect multiple variables that 
determine the firm’s optimal appropriation time.  For example, pursuing 
related yet dissimilar production technologies can result in different costs of 
establishing a claim, different values capable of being appropriated from the 
resources, and different rates at which the resource values change over time. 
In all likelihood, technological developments will affect all of these variables 
simultaneously.   
It is also important to note that firms investing in technologies that will 
increase their capacity to appropriate celestial land have broader effects than 
those specified in the above problem situations.  The race for celestial land is 
not just a resource sink.  The technologies that firms develop to explore and 
appropriate space are in themselves wealth creating.  In the context of the 
above problem situations, one way this could be incorporated is by explicitly 
linking investments in cost-reducing appropriations technologies to increases 
in the potential resource values to be appropriated.  If claims to asteroid 
minerals are established through use, then investing in capacity to appropriate 
those resources is nearly identical to investing in capacity to channel them into 
production lines that are globally wealth enhancing.35   
 
 34 ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973). 
 35 In the language of economics, the race scenario presumes the returns from the 
resource and the costs of establishing a claim are exogenous.  That is, they are parameters 
whose value for the model are given.  In reality, both the returns and the costs of 
establishing property rights are endogenous: they are, at least partially, a result of profit-
seeking firms’ choice in technology investments. A more complex model would 
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The best characterization of the race for celestial land can be listed as 
follows: 
• Potential claimants of celestial land will not be homogeneous.  They 
will differ in crucial ways in terms of endowments and strategies that 
will result in nontrivial heterogeneity. 
• Potential claimants of celestial land will be imperfectly informed about 
the values of the variables informing their competitor’s optimal 
strategies.  Firms with similar mission statements and business plans 
will probably be better informed about each other than more distant 
competitors.  Deep Space Industries will know more about Planetary 
Resource’s technological capacity (and vice versa), and hence claim 
costs, resource values, and resource growth rates, than it will about 
similar factors for SpaceX. 
• The competition among potential claimants for cost-reducing 
appropriations technology will not result solely in sunk resources.  The 
same technologies that will be used to establish a claim will be used 
to increase the value of a given claim.  Investments in claim capacity 
and investments in utilization capacity are complements, not 
substitutes.   
Each of these three points cut against wealth dissipation.  In combination, 
they give us good reason to believe that celestial land wealth will not be 
wasted in a commercial space race.  Undoubtedly, some resources will be used 
in ways ex ante that, ex post, turn out to be wasteful.  But this is true of the 
competitive process for regular terrestrial industries as well.  Competition is a 
discovery procedure,36 and the investments by private space enterprises in 
discovering the best way to deliver value to consumers is, both on its own and 
through the reduction in appropriation costs, a globally wealth-creating 
process.  The tools of law and economics give us strong reasons to suspect 
that a commercial space race will not be economically inefficient. 
IV. BUT WHAT ABOUT THE LEGAL SYSTEM? 
 
The above examples assumed there was some system in place for defining 
and enforcing property rights to celestial land.  This was necessary to 
demonstrate the economic implications of a commercial space race; why we 
might worry about such a race, and the ultimate mitigating factors that led us 
to conclude that private enterprise in space, at least on this issue, would be net 
 
demonstrate how technological investment affects returns and costs, as well as introduce a 
production complementarity between returns and costs.  However, that would take us far 
beyond the purposes of this paper. 
 36 F.A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, 5  Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 9 
(2002); F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (Univ. Chicago Press 1948). 
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wealth-creating. However, the existence of such a legal system cannot be 
taken for granted. OST Article II clearly forbids the extension of territorial 
jurisdiction to space. As mentioned previously, the implications for real 
property are clear: states cannot create and enforce such rights.37  However, it 
may also be the case that all state protection of celestial property rights is 
impermissible.38  “The majority view of Article I and Article II is property 
rights in celestial bodies, whether real or personal, are prohibited, including 
private persons.”39 Commenting on the update of United States commercial 
space legislation contained in the 2015 SPACE Act,40 which attempts to 
provide some security to space entrepreneurs by guaranteeing them the rights 
to space resources, Tronchetti writes: 
The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act appears 
to collide with numerous provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Particularly problematic is its relation with Article II of the 
Treaty. Under the Act the United States attributes itself the 
right to confer property rights over space resources to its 
private companies. Importantly, under international law, 
property rights require a superior authority, a State, entitled to 
attribute and enforce them. This signifies that States need to 
have property rights first before being allowed to attribute 
them to other entities. Seeing from this perspective the Act 
could be interpreted as an attempt by the United States to claim 
property rights over asteroid resources, a position which would 
clash with the non-appropriation clause, not lastly because, as 
described, there is no consensus on whether these resources 
can be appropriated and exploited.41 
This is where political factors complicate the analysis concerning 
consequences of private enterprise in space.  International law is unclear to 
what extent state-enforced private property rights in space are allowed. 
Clarification of existing law can only come about through cooperation among 
sovereign parties to OST. Because any such clarification requires de facto 
unanimity, at least among the serious spacefaring powers, the bargaining costs 
 
 37 OST, supra note 5. 
 38 This question takes precedence over whether asteroid minerals ought to be classified 
as real or personal property, which is not considered here. 
 39 Michael J. Listner, Special Issue on Asteroid Mining, XII The Precis. Newsletter of 
Space Law & Policy Solutions 3, (2017). 
 40 Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act, Pub. L. No. 
114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015). 
 41 Fabio Tronchetti, The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: A Move 
Forward or a Step Back?, 34 SPACE POLICY 6, 9 (2015). 
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over reaching an acceptable solution will undoubtedly be quite high.  For 
example, the United States, the state currently with the greatest public and 
private space capacity, may favor immediate amendment of international law 
to favor appropriation of celestial resources by private parties, with private 
parties’ activity supervised by public authorities as per OST.42  But states with 
up-and-coming programs, such as China, have an incentive to stall such 
renegotiations until they are in a position as favorable as the United States 
towards appropriating celestial resources.  A vibrant space economy is a 
source of national prestige, as well as a resource base that political actors can 
use in pursuing both domestic and international agendas, so we can expect 
sovereigns to engage in some amount of international gamesmanship in the 
service of developing their domestic space economies.  This ultimately 
increases international bargaining costs, rendering a treaty-based solution to 
previous legal ambiguities concerning space property rights unlikely. 
But there is another possibility for the foundations of a commercial space 
legal regime. The ambiguity in current international law with respect to 
property rights ultimately hinges on state enforcement.  The dominant view is 
that states are necessary to define and enforce property rights. But both 
theoretically and historically, this is not so. The literature on private 
governance and self-governance cited in the Introduction provides 
overwhelming evidence that a high degree of social order and commercial 
development can arise from privately governed agreements, even in the 
absence of a sovereign. The difficulties with establishing rights to celestial 
resources according to public law do not exist in the alternative of private law. 
Salter and Leeson 43and Salter 44 develop arguments showing why private 
law works in theory, and how it has in fact worked in history, with application 
to a private commercial order in outer space.  Hertzfeld and von der Dunk45 
develop a sophisticated legal argument showing how space property rights can 
be consistent with treaty obligations. Instead of merely repeating their 
arguments, this paper will consider the context in which private space law can 
arise and shape commercial development.  For the purposes relevant to 
celestial land appropriation, this can be stated quite briefly.  Ultimately the 
purpose of a private legal regime for space commerce is resolving disputes in 
as low-cost a manner as possible.46  Space entrepreneurs wish to make profits 
 
 42 The relevant portion is Article VI, which has not been explicitly discussed because it 
is only tangentially relevant to this paper’s thesis. 
 43 Salter & Leeson, supra note 13, at 584-592. 
 44 Salter, supra note 13. 
 45 Henry R. Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the 
Commercial World: Property Rights without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 100 (2005). 
 46 To be more precise, legal disputes between space entrepreneurs will tend towards a 
least-cost equilibrium, including time foregone in adjudication that could be used in 
ordinary business operations. 
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by exploiting celestial resources. It is inevitable that, at some point, their 
activities will come into conflict with each other. This will likely involve 
establishing who has what rights to the particular and separable portion of 
outer space resources: who may use surface space, who may access sub-
surface minerals, who may appropriate water, and under what conditions these 
claims are exclusive.  Other issues will involve when such rights are alienable 
in the event they are claimed by the same party, and when the rights are 
bundled together (e.g., surface space with directly and shallowly subsurface 
minerals).  These hypotheticals have something in common: they are all issues 
that domestic private law systems have been dealing with for hundreds, if not 
thousands, of years.  Especially in common law systems, the law of property, 
contract, and torts are thick with precedents addressing precisely these 
dilemmas. Asteroid mining, though exotic, does not clearly differ from 
terrestrial mining in a legally relevant manner.  Furthermore, these precedents 
are publicly available in various legal repositories, making it likely they can 
easily become public knowledge for any space firm capable of employing 
even a minimal legal staff.  For example, Bell47 has developed an ‘open source 
legal system’ called Ulex, which specifies the relevant legal decisions that will 
determine how rights are allocated in the event of a dispute.  It also specifies 
various procedural rules, which focus on the process by which disputes will 
be resolved. Procedurally, parties to a dispute each propose a remedy and 
select a judge.  The two judges then select a third judge, and the panel decides 
upon one of the proposed remedies.  In addition to the remedy, the loser pays 
the winner’s adjudication costs. Substantively, the legal rules for allocating 
rights are taken from the Restatement of the Common Law (published by the 
American Law Institute) and the Uniform Commercial Code, as well as a few 
more highly specialized sources. Ulex is just one possible source that serves 
as a low-cost focal point for legal coordination in a private law system. 
Ultimately any system voluntarily consented to by the parties in question will 
do.  The requirement of voluntary consent to the legal system will tend to 
select systems that have historically proven to be durable in the force of their 
decisions, and efficient in costs of operation. 
The tricky issue seems to be enforcement.  Granted legal precedents exist 
that can serve as effective means of allocating rights in the event of a dispute, 
what gives such decisions force in absence of a sovereign?  Scholars of self-
governing communities argue that voluntary self-regulation works best in the 
event of relatively small communities where community members can easily 
communicate with each other and can be expected to have repeated 
interactions with each other.  This mechanism is called the discipline of 
continuous dealings. Suppose Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources 
 
 47 TOM W. BELL, YOUR NEXT GOVERNMENT?: FROM THE NATION STATE TO STATELESS 
NATIONS app. B at 247-254 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017). 
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come into conflict over a particular mineral deposit, and consent to have their 
dispute arbitrated by a panel of industry experts.  The panel rules against Deep 
Space Industries.  It is true that Deep Space Industries could defy the panel, if 
the payoff from doing so is sufficiently large.  But the costs of this antisocial 
behavior are also large; it will become public knowledge in the space 
commerce community that Deep Space Industries cannot be trusted to abide 
by its promises. Other organizations will no longer trust Deep Space 
Industries; they will no longer be willing to cooperate with it in potentially 
mutually profitable ventures.  The consequence to Deep Space Industries from 
reneging on its agreements is significantly smaller future payoff potentials. 
Thus there is a mechanism that punishes antisocial behavior by firms, even in 
absence of a sovereign to do the punishing.  If the board of Deep Space 
Industries is incredibly impatient, and is willing to forsake significant future 
benefits for a one-time present gain, the likely result will be reneging.  But 
given the firms that make up the commercial space industry must make 
significant current investments in order to have the chance of financial returns 
decades down the line, it seems very unlikely that the space industry will be 
populated by impatient, opportunistic rogues. The nature of the cost 
investments in commercial space is a strong filter that selects for patient, 
cooperative behaviors. Reneging on arbitration agreements governed by 
private law will not likely be a concern. 
In brief, there is nothing preventing space enterprises from voluntarily 
agreeing to a private legal system for adjudicating disputes.  Private law can 
fill the gap created by the difficulties, in the international context, of formally 
amending public law.  The economic analysis in Sections 2 and 3 showed that 
the worries over a wasteful commercial space race are overblown, conditional 
upon an effective legal system for establishing and enforcing celestial 
property claims. In addition, the legal overview in Section 4 suggested a 
simple way that legal system can come about. 
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD SOVEREIGNS DO? 
 
The preamble to OST contains valuable information about international 
lawyers’ and diplomats’ intent to create new rights and obligations for states 
in the context of space activities.48  While the preamble itself does not specify 
any new rights and obligations, it does provide important hermeneutical 
context for what kind of governance regime the parties to the treaty envisaged. 
The preamble announces that the space governance regime should reflect the 
“common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of 
 
 48 Christopher Daniel Johnson, International Law Governing Outer Space 
Activities, in OUTER SPACE LAW: LEGAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 1,4 (Yanal Abul Failat & 
Anél Ferreira-Snyman eds., 2017). 
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outer space for peaceful purposes,” and that “the exploration and use of outer 
space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the 
degree of their economic or scientific development…”49  Given the significant 
developments in the commercial space sector, now is the time to ask: is the 
appropriation of celestial land by private parties consistent with the purpose 
and object of OST? 
The law and economics analysis conducted above suggests private 
enterprise in space, including the appropriation of celestial resources, will not 
have deleterious effects. The predicable economic inefficiency created by a 
resource race will not materialize in space. Due to heterogeneity among 
competitors, as well as mutual information conditions, a commercial space 
race can be expected to create wealth for mankind, not destroy it.  
Furthermore, sovereigns do not need to modify extensively the international 
legal environment to secure this wealth. Private companies, operating 
according to market-chosen law50, can and will take advantage of the 
commercial opportunities afforded by celestial resources.  So long as these 
companies have a reasonable expectation that existing states will not move to 
seize this wealth, or penalize its creation, the prospects for a wealth-creating 
commercial space order are bright. 
Considered in light of the above, the next natural question is, what should 
sovereigns do? The dominant approach focuses on modifying existing 
international law.  Scholars recognize that private enterprise in space is a de 
facto certainty.  Even given the legal ambiguities present in OST Articles I 
and II,51 the benefits to sovereigns tacitly allowing, if not actively 
encouraging, their commercial space actors to appropriate celestial resources 
are too great to ignore.52  This impels the push to modify international law to 
reflect the changed reality of space, which no longer resembles Cold War 
conditions. De jure rights and obligations, in this line of thinking, cannot 
completely surrender to de facto conditions—outer space ought not be 
surrendered to the clutches of realpolitik—but they should nonetheless be 
commensurate with these conditions. One solution is to amend public 
international law by creating international oversight over private parties” 
 
 49 OST, supra note 5. 
 50 Edward Peter Stringham, Market-Chosen Law, 14 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 53 
(1998); EDWARD P. STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER IN ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL LIFE (Oxford Univ. Press 2015); BRUCE BENSON, ENTERPRISE OF LAW JUSTICE 
WITHOUT THE STATE (Indep. Inst. 2011); Salter & Leeson, supra note 13; Salter, supra note 
13; BELL, supra note 47. 
 51 Philip De Man, The Exploitation of Natural Resources in Outer Space, in OUTER 
SPACE LAW: LEGAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 243, 254 (Yanal Abul Failat & Anél Ferreira-
Snyman eds., 2017). 
 52  Wilan Erlank, Property and Ownership in Outer Space, in OUTER SPACE LAW: LEGAL 
POLICY AND PRACTICE 1–14 (Yanal Abul Failat & Anél Ferreira-Snyman eds., 2017). 
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claims to celestial resources.  However, this it is not the only solution. Rather 
than a top-down approach that implicitly attempts to plan the outer space legal 
commercial order, sovereigns can best contribute to the commercial 
development of space “for the benefit of all peoples”53 by allowing a bottom-
up evolutionary process to govern space commerce.  In this framework, law 
exists to ameliorate conflicts; where there is no conflict, there is no need to 
define and enforce rules specifying rights and obligations.  Conflicts between 
space entrepreneurs will inevitably arise.  Space may be large, but valuable 
martian real estate and asteroid minerals are still scarce.  When conflicts do 
arise, private space enterprises can and should make reference to the body of 
legal precedents that have arisen out of similar terrestrial disputes.  Because 
the problems of celestial resource appropriation are not fundamentally 
different in character from those of terrestrial resource appropriation, these 
precedents are a good place upon which to found a body of private and 
voluntary law for resolving commercial space disputes.   
Sovereigns can and should remain committed to the principle that the 
appropriation of celestial real estate, and the extension of territorial 
jurisdiction thereto, is contrary to humanity’s peaceful and mutually enriching 
experience in space. Realpolitik considerations aside, this lofty goal is 
achievable simply because territorial appropriation is frequently discrete and 
visible.  The costs to any sovereign, even those with the greatest current space 
capacity, of flagrantly reneging on treaty obligations are quite high.  But 
sovereigns should also direct their efforts to shoring up their domestic space 
regimes.  This will involve making a credible commitment not to appropriate 
the creation of wealth by private space enterprises, nor punish the creation of 
this wealth.  Even without the positive guarantee that sovereigns will defend 
their citizens’ claims to celestial property rights in court, the negative 
guarantee that no move will be made to attenuate these rights will provide a 
significant incentive for celestial wealth creation. 
This article has shown that the appropriation of celestial resources will not 
have destructive consequences for humanity. There will be a commercial 
space race, and it will be on net wealth-creating for humanity.  Thus 
sovereigns should be cautiously optimistic about space as a source of social 
wealth creation. Private and voluntarily chosen law is well suited to govern 
new space commercial relationships. Thus it is important that sovereigns 
avoid the temptation to plan in advance what the legal regime for space ought 
to look like.  There are a number of existing problems, such as guaranteeing 
all states access to orbit, further specifying liability rules, and mitigating the 
problems posed by space debris,54 to which sovereigns ought to devote their 
 
 53  OST, supra note 5. 
 54  Alexander William Salter, Space Debris: A Law and Economics Analysis of the 
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attention.  For the time being, space commerce, including a commercial space 
race, does not pose a threat to international harmony or human welfare, and 
in fact promises to be a boon. 
